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Book Reviews
FEDERAL ESTATE AND

GIFT TAX-

By Randolph E. Paul. Boston:
Little, Brown &Co., 1942. 2 vols. Pp.
ATION,

xx, 1615.

$20.

The book under review is the first
complete and detailed treatise upon
the important subject of the federal
estate and gift taxes. Like the author's
previous work of several years ago
(with Jacob Mertens, Jr.) on the federal income tax, it has the disadvantage of subjection to very rapid obsolescence; but also like that previous
work it contains valuable discussion
of principles which are unlikely to entirely lose-their importance and value,
no matter how many changes are made
in the statutes.
We have learned to expect from the
author a thorough, profound but practical study of any tax problem to
which he addresses himself. And the
present work is no exception to that
rule; it is complete and scholarly, and
yet discusses every problem in a way
which is very helpful and adequate
from the standpoint of the practicing
lawyer. Perhaps there is a somewhat
greater tendency than previously to
emphasize the Treasury standpoint.
This is hardly surprising since the author is now one of the most important
Treasury officials-indeed probably
the most important from the standpoint
of tax policy. But he was still in private practice when he wrote the book,
and he has certainly not neglected the
point of view of the taxpayer and his
counsel.
The order of presentation of the
topics is perhaps a bit unusual for a
treatise. One might naturally expect a
discussion of the substantive provisions
of the estate tax law, then the similar provisions of the gift tax law, and
finally a discussion of the procedural
matters, most of which are applicable
to the administration of both laws. In
fact, the book commences this way,
most of the first volume dealing with
the substantive provisions of the es-

tate tax. But then the author immediately discusses the procedural matters,
and only after they are completed does
he go into the substantive problems of
the gift tax. The final chapter deals
with problems of valuation.
As already said, this order of presentation seems a little peculiar, but it
probably will not cause any real inconvenience in the use of the book. At
any rate, there is a thorough and adequate index, as well as tables of cases
and secondary authorities, and tables
showing the numbering of the provisions in various revenue acts in relation to the present Code.
The author expresses himself as very
much disturbed by the undue complexity of the statutory provisions for
both of these taxes, especially the estate tax. But he points out other complicating factors, especially the problems of community property, which
are almost as disturbing here as with
respect to the income tax.
One of the greatest causes for complication in the estate tax is the distinction between the "basic tax," and
the additional tax. The reason for retaining this distinction is of course
that the credit for state inheritance
taxes and the like is granted in computing the basic tax but not in computing the much heavier additional
tax. The author suggests some methods
for simplifying these provisions, but
somewhat surprisingly does not suggest the total abolition of the credit
for state inheritance taxes. Since the
original purpose of that credit-namely to compel all states to impose an
inheritance tax or the like-has been
accomplished, it is at least arguable
that the whole credit might well be
wiped out.
An even more potent cause of complexity with respect to the statutory
provisions and administrative rulings
is the relation of these two taxes between themselves and to other federal
taxes, especially the income tax. Perhaps the whole problem could be
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solved by adopting the suggestion
somewhat dubiously advanced by the
author in the early part of the book 1
of treating inheritances as income to
the beneficiaries. But he himself apparently recognizes the improbability
of the acceptance of this suggestion
by Congress, at least in the near future.
The estate tax and the gift tax fit
together fairly well, though Mr. Paul
admits, as many others have previously pointed out, that the credit in the
estate tax for gift taxes previously paid
with respect to the same property is
very limited and really inadequate.
But neither tax fits so well with the
income tax. This is partly because of
unfortunate discrepancies between the
treatment of similar problems in the
income and estate tax provisions. An
example is trusts revocable with the
consent of other persons than the settlor, where the estate tax provisions
are more rigid than those included in
the income tax law. The author properly points out that the gift tax "flounders" between the estate and the income
tax, seeking consistency with both and
ending up with complete consistency
with neither. For this unfortunate situation he seems inclined to blame the
Treasury slightly and the courts much
more; but it would seem that the main
cause is the inconsistency in the statutory provisions. Undoubtedly, as the
author says, the gift tax was intended
to "rescue" both the estate tax and the
income tax from the partial futility into which they seemed to be falling;
but the rescue was primarily of the estate tax, as the author impliedly admits by treating these two taxes together in his book. It is submitted that
the Supreme Court is probably correct
in insisting primarily upon reasonable
consistency of treatment with respect
to these two taxes, even at the expense
of consistency with the income tax2
situation, as it did in the Sanford case.
Nevertheless, the author is correct in
deploring many of these inconsistencies. He points out that they are often
1p. 7.

2308 U. S. 39 (1939).

quite unfair to taxpayers-probably
more so than to the Treasury-though
he properly insists that inconsistency
of Treasury rulings is not necessarily
a proof of error. The real difficulty is
not merely that the estate tax, the gift
tax, and the income tax have inconsistent provisions. Even worse is the
substantial failure to integrate these
three taxes, even when the provisions
are formally consistent. The author insists that the interrelation of these
taxes needs congressional attention,
though he candidly admits practical
difficulties in fitting them together perfectly. It is believed that the general
position of the author will be fervently echoed by the Treasury and taxpayers alike.
This is one of the most important
reforms which the author urges. In addition, he constantly advocates the doing away entirely with the special provisions with respect to community property. As already pointed out, this system is almost as troublesome for the
estate tax and the gift tax as with respect to the income tax, though the
former taxes do not involve the problems of joint returns. In addition, he
suggests some considerable tightening
up of the estate tax provisions with resect to gifts in contemplation of
d'ath, where he correctly points out
that the courts have on the whole been
quite unfavorable to the Government.
He expresses the opinion that the present Court would sustain a statutory
provision making the presumption conclusive that a gift of any substantial
part of property within a limited period before death was in contemplation of death. The reviewer is inclined
to concur; but it is still true that there
would be large room for dispute as to
what is a "substantial" gift for this
purpose. Would it not be better to integrate completely the estate and gift
taxes, by including in the taxable estate all gifts (beyond the exemption)
made during the decedent's life, computing the estate tax on this basis,
and then crediting the tax so computed with gift taxes actually paid during
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life? This would completely wipe out
the dispute as to whether gifts were
in contemplation of death, since this
problem would have no significance
for tax purposes. Mr. Paul does suggest this solution but without much
enthusiasm. 3 Perhaps he feels that there
is little chance of its being adopted by
Congress.
What has been said already affords
some hint of the author's tax philosophy. However, this should be more
definitely referred to, not only because
of its effect on the discussion in the
book, but also because it is likely to
have considerable influence on Treasury practices.
At times, it appears to reflect the
worst of Treasury bureaucracy. For example, the author appears to be horrified at the statement attributed to Mr.
J. P. Morgan that he saw no reason
for paying any more taxes than the law
calls for. The reviewer is compelled
to confess that he entirely approves
this point of view, but his embarrasment is minimized by his reasonable
confidence that it is shared by practically all taxpayers, including taxing
officials when they happen themselves
to be in the position ot taxpayers. Furthermore, the author urges that no lawyer should lend himself to any schemes
for avoiding taxes, since such schemes
will probably be defeated by subsequent enactment or-a cynic might
add-by the courts writing into the
statute something they think Congress
unjustifiably omitted. Undoubtedly this
advice is largely sound and practical;
but it is buttressed by the theory that
a lawyer should be a "social thinker."
The trouble with this is that there is
no sure way of telling just how a lawyer or anybody else should think on
social questions, and there is certainly
no assurance that he should never resist the Government's position on tax
questions. Sometimes, though it must
be confessed that recently it is rare,
such resistance is successful.
Another point on which the reviewer finds his own philosophy inconsist3P. 89.

ent with that of the author is with regard to the question of using the taxing power for supposed social ends,
particularly for regulation. It is submitted that the taxing power is to
raise revenue, and that to use it for
regulatory purposes is not only theoretically unsound but practically undesirable. Regulatory taxes are likely
to flounder between regulation and
revenue just as the author points out
that the gift tax flounders between supplementing the estate tax and the income tax; and using such taxes is apt
to end up with ineffective and unjust
regulation, and little revenue. It must
be confessed of course that all taxes
have regulatory effects, which should
not be overlooked; and this is perhaps
more true of the federal estate tax
than almost any other. But to use the
taxing power primarily for regulation
is in the reviewer's opinion to misuse
it both theoretically and practically.
Also Mr. Paul is much better satisfied with what the judiciary has done
on tax problems than would be very
general outside of governmental circles. He quotes with apparent seriousness from the New Republic to the
effect that the Supreme Court has made
a "simple clean-cut consistent body of
judicial utterances ' ' 4 with respect to
taxes. He has already rather frankly
distinguished judicial action for and
against the revenue, indicating that the
former is to be preferred. 5 A pure outsider would think that judicial action
should be evenly balanced for and
against the revenue, and that judicial
legislation on either side is thoroughly
unjustified. The author properly points
out that judicial statements that "substance not form" is the criteria for
solving tax problems, usually are unintelligible, and are repeated ad nauseam; 6 but the truth appears to be that,
at least recently, this phrase has been
much more often used to attempt to
justify doubtful or clearly unjust decisions against taxpayers, than vice
versa. Furthermore, the author's scoff4

P. 84.
5P. 44.
6P. 1064.
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ing at any necessity for a conservative
dividend policy by corporations, as he7
does in his chapter on valuation,
would hardly be applauded by the
S.E.C. or those who have to practice
before it.
Fortunately these rather extreme positions are not adhered to with respect
to the author's discussion of many of
the more specific problems. Indeed, as
will appear, he sometimes takes positions which seem almost as unfavorable to the Government, especially
with respect to certain deductions. No
doubt his philosophy inevitably colors
his thinking throughout the book; but
his practical sense, his experience, and
his innate sense of justice often prevent him from going too far.
The foregoing substantially covers
what it seems necessary to say with respect to the first six chapters of the
book, which deal with general principles of the estate tax and also with
the special subjects of property subject
to dower and curtesy, and transfers in
contemplation of death. However, some
acute comments in the first chapter
with respect to the effect of local court
decrees on the estate tax should be
noted." It is pointed out that property
rights are conclusively determined by
such decrees, at least if they are the
result of a real adversary proceeding;
but that such a decree does not necessarily determine that there has not been
a substantial transfer by death, which
is subject to federal estate tax.
The eighth chapter deals with transfers taking effect on death. Here, as
might be expected, 'a great deal of
space is given to a discussion of the
Hallock case. 9 It is pointed out that
the case has not settled all of the problems; in particular it has not determined whether the ending of the reserved right of reverter is to be taxed
on the basis of its own value, which is
usually trifling, or at the whole value
of the property. The Treasury has to
date taken a somewhat compromise position, deducting only the value of the
7P. 1295.
sP. 80 ff.
'309 U. S. 106 (1940).

life interest of the present holder.
However, the author properly points
out that even this concession may not
be necessary under the Hallock opinion.
He concedes that it seems rather absurd to tax the transfer of this remote
right of reverter on the basis of the
entire value of the property; but the
possibility of this cannot be safely neglected. This is especially menacing,
since there is invariably a possibility
of reverter to the settlor unless it is
explicitly done away with by the creation of a final remainder which could
not possibly fail for lack of heirs,
which transfer would also be taxable,
with the same problem as to valuation.
It is suggested that this can be avoided by creating a final remainder to
some charity. This seems sound enough,
though it would lead to the absurdity
of numerous bequests to charity, not
one in a thousand of which would
ever come into effect. It seems that
this problem should be given Congressional attention.
The next chapter dealing with property held jointly or by the entirety
needs no further comment; but the
chapter on powers of appointment is
worthy of notice. This is a matter of
great difficulty, for which Congress is
partly to blame; for the author's criticism of the very narrow limits with
respect to taxability in this category
seems entirely justified. His criticism
of the occasional tendency of the
courts to use "donor's hand" theory
with respect to appointments for tax
cases is also quite justified; though
this theory has been fairly well repudiated, at least with respect to the
federal estate tax. But he suggests that
the passing of property by special as
well as general powers of appointment
should be subjected to tax, with the
limitation that exemption should be
given when the power is restricted to
appointment to decendants of either
the donor or the donee of the power.
This seems like a sensible suggestion,
though it is of course a problem of
policy for the exclusive determination
of Congress.
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The next chapter deals with the subject of life insurance. Here the problems are especially perplexing. The
author comments extensively with respect to the Le Gierse case, 10 denying
the special insurance deduction where
an annuity is obtained simultaneously
with the insurance policy. He interprets
this decision as meaning a denial of
life insurance exemption "in any case
where the same company issues an annuity large enough so that the premium
paid for it, when added to the insurance premium, will equal or exceed
the face value of the insurance policy."" If, however, the insurance policy is for a substantially larger amount,
and even more clearly if it is issued by
a different company, it seems clear that
there is an insurance risk, and that the
additional exemption may be obtained.
There is another serious problem
with respect to the definition and effect of "incidence of ownership," as
litigated in the Bailey case,' 2 with its
multiple appeals. The author's defense
of the Treasury's regulation making
different interpretations of the statute
depend upon the time when the policy was taken out in relation to the
various Bailey decisions will, as he
says, probably not shock experienced
tax lawyers, though they will find it
rather hard to explain to less experienced persons, who may perhaps understand that the apparent meaning
of a statute may be changed by judicial decision, but who are likely to
have difficulty in the idea that the old
meaning remains in effect as to transactions before the decision.
Most, though not quite all, of the
federal courts, have held that where
an insolvent estate has insurance policies which are not subject to claims,
the claims must nevertheless be deducted in full, resulting in no tax. The
reviewer shares the author's inability
to justify this conclusion as a matter
of statutory construction or common
sense. But since this is the prevailing
10312 U. S. 531 (1941).
11P. 504.
"31
F. Supp. 778 (1940),
S. 721 (1940).
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law, it should be corrected by express
amendment.
With all these and numerous other
problems in this life insurance chapter, the reader is not surprised at the
first sentence of the concluding section
which reads "This picture of life insurance and the estate tax is not a
happy one." This rather lengthy section is itself somewhat confused but
perhaps excusably so. The author's apparent opinion that the additional life
insurance exemption should be wholly
given up, is certainly somewhat questionable; but in any event, the still
seething problems should and can
largely be solved by carefully drafted
amendments.
Now come the two chapters with regard to estate tax deductions. The first
of these deals with all deductions except transfers for charitable purposes
and the like, which are considered in
the next chapter.
As previously indicated, the author
shows in this discussion of deductions,
leniency toward the taxpayer somewhat
surprising in one who has already expressed a tax philosophy such as has
been indicated. For instance, he favors
the deduction of anticipated trustees'
commissions, and criticizes the Treasury regulations which deny this. More
surprising still, he severely criticizes
the decision of the Supreme Court in
the Taft case,' 3 which indicates that
no deduction will be allowed for contracts made by a decedent for charitable or religious contributions, even
though such contracts are binding on
his estate and paid by his executor.
The reviewer concurs in the author's
opinion that this is a rather illiberal
statutory provision, but he is unable to
understand how, under the stringent
language of the. statute, the deduction
can possibly be allowed. It is true that
promises by other contributors may be
just as binding as money; but they are
not money or money's worth, and that
is what the statute prescribes.
But here too, the author does not let
his liberality to taxpayers carry him

cet. dim. 311 U.
"304 U. S. 351 (1938).
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far beyond all bounds. He points out
that the Government itself is the greatest of charitable functionaries. Perhaps
a cynic would doubt whether governmental activities are quite so completely motivated by pure devotion to the
public weal as is here indicated. But,
on the other hand, it must be confessed
that the only jusification for this entire
class of deductions is that the beneficiaries do things which must, or at
least should, otherwise be done by the
Government, and so their activities reduce the governmental burden.
Now we come to the procedural
chapters. The first deals with the procedure within the Bureau. Here there
is not quite so much statutory material;
but there is an enormous mass of administrative rulings, which are thoroughly digested, with many practical
hints. In discussing the apportionment
of the tax, the author prophesies, but
without approval, the possible invalidation of the New York statute providing for the apportionment of the tax
to the beneficiaries qf the estate-a result which
has since unfortunately oc4
curred.1
The other procedure chapter is concerned primarily with the Board of Tax
Appeals and court reviews of its decisions, though also including court
actions for the recovery of alleged
overpayments. The author seems to admit that the Board, though insistently
called an administrative body, is essentially a court. His chief criticism
made is that the Board has statutory
jurisdiction only when a deficiency is
asserted. It is pointed out that this
quite naturally leads to the original
understating of the tax liability-so
that the Commissioner is compelled to
assert a deficiency, and then the taxpayer can take the case to the Board,
which has jurisdiction to give a refund.
To give the Board original jurisdiction
over claims for refund would seem
highly desirable from the standpoint
of the Treasury as well as that of the
taxpayer.
The author finds other unfairnesses
'4See In re Del Grago, 287 N. Y. 61, 38 N.
E. (2d) 131 (1941).

in the procedural provisions, especially
from the standpoint of the taxpayer.
He is especially critical of what he regards as ungenerous rules as to the
amendments of refund claims-again
a situation where there is undoubtedly
something to be said from the standpoint of the Treasury-and still more
critical of the extremely stringent rules
with respect to suits against the Government. The latter point was extensively and vigorously commented on
in the recent Hammond-Knowlton
case, 15 and seems certainly a situation
where Congress should liberalize the
rules.
Finally, the author urges that suits
against Collectors of Internal Revenue
be abolished. The reviewer himself
concurs in this recommendation,
though he does so with some trep idation, in view of the very strong objections to this proposal which usually
arise from practical tax lawyers.
This completes the procedural problems for both taxes; and now, following the order already referred to, we
come to the discussion of the substantive provisions of the gift tax. Here
there is somewhat less complication,
though there are certainly complications enough. The whole matter is
lucidly explained in the general chapter on this subject. Two comments with
respect to matters treated in this chapter seem worth while. The first is the
suggestion of some limitation of the
statutory amendment to the effect that
there is no personal exemption for
gifts to trusts. The purpose of this
rule, as appears in the fuller discussion
in a later chapter on trusts, was to
avoid the possibility that the courts
would hold the trust itself to be the
donee, and the tax thereby be subject
to avoidance by setting up a number
of different trusts for the same beneficiary. Since the courts have clearly
held that the beneficiaries rather than
the trust are the donees, there seems
to the reviewer little excuse for this
rigid rule, and it is believed that the
personal exemption for gifts to trusts
should be reinstated.
15121 F. (2d) 192 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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The author also suggests restricting
the exemption to gifts to members of
the donor's own family. Undoubtedly
there is more justification for such a
restriction than for the purely arbitrary
one with respect to trusts. On the other
hand, a rather curious result would follow where a person had used up his
basic exemption. He would then have
to carefully list and pay a tax on every
box of cigars and similar items which
he gave to his friends or business associates at Christmas. Perhaps the solution is to reduce personal exemptions
as to gifts outside the family below
those granted for those within the family; but it seems hardly practical to
wipe them out altogether.
The chapter on taxable gifts is a
further development of the many problems, most of them rather technical, relating to the application of the tax.
Curiously enough, the most troublesome points seem to relate to corporations. The author properly points out
that the broad Treasury regulations
that gifts by a corporation are gifts by
its stockholders, are rather too broad,
but suggests that they can stand if
properly limited by construction. It is
submitted that, by the plain terms of
the statute, a gift by a corporation is
not taxable. This does not mean that
under certain circumstances a corporation may act as a mere agent of its
stockholders, and the gift really be by
them. But this is not likely to happen
except in a closely held and more or
less fraudulent corporation; though,
on the other hand, corporations of
other descriptions are not likely to
make gifts.
The other difficulty is when the corporation is the recipient of a gift. The
author considers that the effect of the
Treasury rulings is that the gift is to
the corporation or to the stockholders
whichever will give the greater tax.
Here again we have a canon of construction which seems to be on a heads
I win, tails you lose basis. However, it
is probably not so bad as it sounds,
since if the corporation is religious,
charitable, or the like, the gift is nontaxable; and if the corporation is not

within these categories, it is hard to
imagine that there has been a real gift.
Finally there is the chapter on valuation, which is of immense importance
in the estate tax and the gift taxeven more so than in the income tax.
The discussion is pretty general but
erhaps the author is hardly to be
lamed for this. It is pointed out that
the estate tax may apply even though
there is no fair market value and that
there is also a distinction in the value
of notes for income and estate tax purposes. Here a discrepancy between income tax standards on the one side and
the estate and to a less degree the gift
tax standards on the other side, is not
only excusable but seems quite inevitable. There is also some criticism in
the book of the Treasury's attempts to
partly salvage something from its
crushing defeat in Maas v. Higgins,16
which invalidated the Treasury ruling
that in case the option to value property one year after death was taken for
estate tax purposes, the income during
that year must be included in the estate tax. Some sympathy is expressed
with the Treasury's feeling that this
may under some circumstances result
in an improper evasion of estate tax.
But serious, and it seems well founded,
doubt is expressed whether the Treasury will be successful in saving anything from this particular catastrophe,
unless it can persuade Congress to
write into the statute what the majority of the Court found has not yet
been done.
And so the reader comes to the end
of this long, and necessarily complicated, but excellent treatise. The reviewer has the uncomfortable suspicion
that most of his criticisms are stated
mainly because any reviewer of a book
must, under the accepted laws of eti7uette governing that activity, cast a
few stones at the author. In any event,
he is convinced that his stones are very
small pebbles, and will not and should
not be really felt. This is a good book
for any one, and an indispensable book
for the federal tax practitioner. Turning from the author to the public, or
16312 U. S. 443 (1941).
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at least that part of the public which
has just been referred to, the reviewer's
advice is to buy the book, read it carefully, and keep it available for constant
reference. For every problem within
its scope, whether technical or relating
to broad policy, the book will be helpful; and it will almost invariably give
as nearly a right answer as is humanly
possible.
ROBERT C. BROWN.*
*Professor of Law, Indiana University School
of Law.

MISSOURI INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES.

By Walter A. Raymond. Kansas City:
Vernon Law Book Company, 1942.
Four Volumes. $30.00.
Both the courts and trial attorneys
will welcome this four volume set of
Raymond on Missouri Instructions to
Juries which is just off the press.
In jury trials, where responsibility
is divided between judge and jury, it
is highly essential that carefully prepared and properly worded instructions
be given to the jury to aid it in reaching a just verdict in accordance with
the law and based upon the evidence
in the case. In large measure it is
through the medium of instructions
that our substantive law, procedurally
stated, is crystallized into rules to guide
those charged with the administration
of the law. The giving of instructions
is one of the primary essentials of
court procedure distinguishing the judicial process from the procedure of
administrative tribunals. Instructionsproper instructions-are vital to the
efficiency of jury trials.
True it is that many verdicts are set
aside and many judgments are reversed
on account of errors in instructions.
This, however, is but indicative of (1)
the lack of careful preparation of instructions by attorneys and (2) the
proper protection that the courts afford
to litigants in seeing that juries are
not misdirected, to the prejudice of
the parties, either as to the law or
the evidence.

We cannot discontinue the giving
of instructions in jury trials. Declarations of law in jury waived cases perform a somewhat similar necessary
function. Perhaps the giving of instructions should be supplemented by
the submission of specific fact questions so that the court will be advised
as to the specific ultimate facts found
by the jury. This is now the practice
in the federal courts and in many state
courts. This procedure is now advocated in Missouri. It is no answer to
the problem of giving proper instructions either (1) to ignore errors in
instructions prejudicial to the rights
of parties on any theory of waiver
based upon the oversight or ignorance
of counsel, or (2) to eliminate the
giving of instructions entirely.
The solution to the vexing problem
of instructions is more care in the
preparation and giving of instructions.
The new work of Raymond on Missouri Instructions to Juries will assist
the trial attorney in the proper preparation of his instructions and will aid
in the proper administration of trial
procedure by helping to avoid errors
in instructions, which errors, if prejudicial to the rights of parties, can but
cause our courts to set aside verdicts
rendered.
Walter A. Raymond, the author of
the new work on instructions, has been
a practicing attorney for the past nineteen years. He has had a wide experience in both the trial and appellate
courts in Missouri. He is an attorney
of high legal ability and great perseverance. His legal qualifications are
recognized by the courts, other attorneys, many of whom have associated
him both in the trial and review of
their particular cases, and by opposing
counsel. Mr. Raymond has efficiently
and painstakingly performed the gigantic task of assembling the instruction material and in clearly stating the
instruction rules. Undoubtedly Mr.
Raymond's work, as he himself expresses the hope, will lighten the burdens and win the approbation of Missouri lawyers.

